CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY:
TRUST ME, I'M TELLING YOU STORIES

by

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Prologue: Are you sitting comfortably?

At the parental knee we listen to stories: we learn our 'position' at story time. As children, we are caught up in stories, woven into narratives. Sitting in front of the class wireless or television, the disciplined listeners and viewers are swept up in stories, re-placed and re-positioned as disciplined characters living out roles within the story being told. Situated on the hyperreal screen we are told tales of soap; of documentary and of news; tales interspersed with thirty second narratives; tales of priests and politicians; of advertisers and ideologues. Yet more; we don’t merely listen, we live through stories. We weave ourselves and others into the stories we tell. Interpersonal relations become the way we weave an interaction story; how we can reposition a partner-character who has strayed from the role we cast her in. Rhetoric and oratory become the arts of turning hecklers into supporters of an heroic narrative: the arts of weaving the unexpected into the manageable. Education becomes the art of sweeping question and student into a lecture-story which positions and constitutes a listener-student.

This essay, through a parallel reading of two texts from 1987, argues that the school of radical social theory which has become known as ‘Critical Criminology’ can productively be seen as a series of narratives of pedigree, of theory and practice which can be deconstructed, shown to be an unstable power-full discourse and thus a capillary of positioning discipline.

Secondly, by addressing public order policing, we find this grid of power, on which Critical Criminology operates, to be part of

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wider discourses and discursive practices of 'governmentality'. This represents a challenge to the established school of 'police critique' in terms of its philosophical instability, its analytic shortcomings and its political ramifications.

Before launching into the parallel deconstruction and reconstitution of the 'subject' of critical social theory, my own story must outline its characters.

*Dramatis Personae*

Once upon a time, there was a 'radical' hero.

Critical Criminology represents (almost metonymically) a certain wider discourse of post '68 Left intellectuals for whom the epithet 'radical' was a calling, a chant and a collective consciousness. For a 'critical' criminology of primarily straight, white, middle-class, male characters, the organic intellectual pedigree deemed so necessary when lining up with the marginalised seemed far away. Answering Dylan's challenge to 'get out or lend a hand'; grasping *The Prison Notebooks* in one hand and *For Marx* in the other, the school of criminology which, through the sixties, saw its storyline shift from 'crime' to 'policing', went a-courtin'.

The second wave of feminism beckoned; the light of 'organic' politico-theoretical praxis floodlit the ivory towers, and Critical Criminology hit the streets. Their 'I's met. The partners exited stage left: a modernist marriage; politicising the personal and the theoretical; personalising theory and politics; theorising the political and the personal: comrades in theoretical arms. So runs the genealogy of Critical Criminology¹ apprentice politico-sociologists are offered.

The second character in my story is that of 'magical reality' typified by Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Isabel Allende and Salman Rushdie. In the antirealist playground where meta-narratives of history, realist development and character stability are blown apart, the reader's desire for security is continually frustrated. The

¹ This story is retold in P. Scraton, ed., *Law, Order and the Authoritarian State* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987), and particularly in its opening piece: J. Sim, P. Scraton and P. Gordon, "Crime, the State and Critical Analysis".
postmodern play without positive terms of magical reality is more than a writerly ploy: it is, as Allende has said, 'a way of life'. In a world of hyperreality, schizophrenia and perpetual presents, representations get continually undermined and refuse to be grounded on essences or presence.

Jeanette Winterson's novel *The Passion* 2 is an odyssey too. The historical tale of a young French peasant at the time of Napoleon and of his love for a Venetian girl is continually undermined by magical worlds of people with webbed feet, fantastic eyesight and hearts woven into tapestries. The reality of passion, too, is destabilised by both storytellers' self-referential crocodile comment: 'Trust me, I'm telling you stories'. The seduction and the suddenforegrounding of narrative power is the key to magical realism and the key to my story's parallel deconstruction.

*Act One: So that's the différence!*

"The intellectual's error consists in believing that it is possible to know without understanding and especially without feeling and passion ... In the absence of such a bond the relations between intellectuals and people-nation are reduced to contacts of a purely bureaucratic, formal kind — the intellectuals become a caste or a priesthood." 3

*Law, Order and the Authoritarian State* and *The Passion* (both published in 1987) work through the same issues and concerns: the nature of relationships between 'master' and servant, between lovers, between worlds and between discourses. The nature of 'passion' and of commitment, and their soaking in 'power'.

'Deconstruction' shows power and passion to be unstable and incapable of carrying the philosophical and political weight they are asked to carry: 'deconstruction' pulls the storyteller's chair away. The key concept is 'destabilisation'. The aim is not to erect a new orthodoxy, to see issues more clearly, or to get nearer to a Truth of Power. The point rather is to explore the relations between the Subject of discourse and the subjects of power and to open them up to

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reconstitution. The aim is to displace rather than to re-place.

'Deconstruction' as a strategy concentrates on the hierarchical oppositions around which texts are built. For its high priest, Jacques Derrida, these are rooted in the "metaphysics of presence ... (the) irrepressible desire for transcendental signified presence, the thing itself, or truth". 'Presence' is the philosophical belief and discursive weapon of the 'I'. The speaking subject to whom meaning is allegedly present and clear, Derrida claims, has been and remains the basis of Western thought.

This philosophical position has built various discourses, ways of seeing, thinking and being around oppositions, where a 'primary' element is privileged over a 'supplementary'. Deconstruction shows the instability of these oppositions, by showing how the very basis of the supplement is actually at the root of the primary. Derrida has shown, for example, that the traditional Western privileging of speech over the 'dangerous' writing is a power-full instance of this 'metaphysics of presence'. He shows how speech should be understood as 'a form of writing'. The privilege is first turned upside down and the hierarchy destabilised. In a second step, the opposition is displaced, shown to be an instance of différence, of difference and deferral.

The privileged oppositions of Critical Criminology are every bit as unstable political and intellectual foundations, as the 'phono-centric' privileging of speech. There are two keys to the Critical Criminological discourse: the relationship of the 'structural' to the 'social' and the position of theory and political passion.

If we start with the opposition between institutional/structural and social/visible relations we find that the first term is privileged analytically while the second is privileged politically. The narrative initially privileges the structural "totality of the ... political economy, historical antecedents, institutionalised racism and the relative autonomy of state practice." But this is kept in tension by a socio-political supplement that appeals to alternative accounts of the operations of policing and real life experiences. Conversely the political strand privileges "interventionism with real commitment

5 Supra n.1, at 30.
to the powerless" to over the danger of a theoreticist focus on the State. The aim throughout is to "balance lived experiences and immediate social contexts with often less visible structural arrangements."

At the heart of this discourse lies a philosophical instability: relations of 'différence' undermine the story of Critical Criminology. The slippage from the structural to the social, from the invisible to the visible, from the analytical to the political are traces of a failed attempt to stabilise and locate the concept of power (relations): traces of a will to power.

Power relations on the streets are seen as traces of the macro-operations of power within a patriarchal, capitalist, post-colonialist state. Thus structural hegemonic Thatcherite Power is analytically privileged over street level social power, and invisible ideological policing over the visible operations of the police. However, the properties of that supplementary power, the social operations of language and ideology and the visible operations of violence appear within critical criminological analysis to form the basis of the primary macro, hegemonic Power project. Simultaneously, the visible relations of power that Critical Criminology's political project prioritises over their structural determinants appear within the text, to consist of the very structural, invisible operations of hegemony that are marginalised as a theoretical supplement.

In both cases the search for stability is continually deferred as the opposition refuses to deliver the 'essential' nature of power. The micro power relations at the social level and the macro operations at the structural are sites of différence. The power sought evades capture and reconstitutes the relations as soon as storytime is finished. The unavoidable slippage, the différence that destabilises Critical Criminology, is now addressed through another broad philosophical almost theological structure: passion. There is a powerful 'metaphysics of passion' that works within the text of Critical Criminology.

6 Ibid., at 10.
7 Ibid., at 5.
No sense of 'play' is evident in the criminological text. 'Fact', 'truth' and 'reality' are anchored in the analytic and political form of the critical discourse and the text. The discursive nature of power, the crumbling of certainties, the expansion of 'surfaces' are treated as so many supplements. An analysis built around the 'Structural' and the 'Social' preserves difference, depth, 'reality' and the space for a passionate politics.

Thus, Critical Criminology and magical realism take a profoundly different approach to conceptual oppositions; criminology keeps its oppositions apart whilst magical realism deconstructs the difference and plays with the resultant difference. It is here that our story turns to the 'metaphysics of passion' that Critical Criminology hangs on to and magical realism seeks to tickle.

For Critical Criminology, the nature of the 'passion' that stabilises its story, is one of commitment, of 'critical war' on the 'mainstream', the 'traditional' and even on their own radical forerunners who have appeased the enemy, ignored the burning bush and fiddled while Toxteth burned; of privileging praxis over the dangerous supplement of theory.

It is no exaggeration to term this reaction a 'war'. The language is of 'strategies', of 'campaigns' and 'sabotage', of 'tactical' positions 'consolidated' and even of 'pessimistic defeatism'. Critical Criminology thus launches a campaign to rescue the 'radical' standard from past and present academic/intellectual ashes.

Their is not to play with the world but to change it. Give the marginalised the bread of politics, not the cake of theory. The marginalised want power to be redistributed, not deconstructed. "Important yet frequently inaccessible debates" must take second place to giving the powerless a knowledge, power, a voice, a language. For a barricades discourse written in a moment of 'crisis', 'theoreticism' must take second place.

'Passion' is painted in vivid colours against a monochromatic 'detachment': a 'cosy academic and political relationship' of ne-

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9 Ibid., at 62.
In the 'zero winter' of Thatcherism some have "abandoned ... the moral and social leadership over the classes they claim to represent." Others have refused to risk political excommunication from the academic game preferring 'responsibility' over 'radicalism', 'security' over 'struggle', 'power' over 'passion'.

The passion of which Critical Criminology tells is one of involvement; of 'close' relationships, in 'serious and difficult struggles'; of 'partnerships'; of 'initial and continuing interventions' and commitment. This 'passion' is constructed in privileged opposition to the 'new realism'. Critical analysis must not head down the Labour Party "political cul-de-sac where 'realistic' policies on crime, welfare, housing, wages, health and schooling predominate over a class analysis." There must be a theoretical armoury, a 'rigorous ... analysis' as addition and finishing touch to the interventionist 'resistance movement'. Theory: 'supplement'; the 'dangerous supplement'.

Thus Critical Criminology's passion, commitment, and politics have at their basis the same theoretical ideology critique that is also seen as the danger. Once again through systematic denial, the metaphysics of passion that Critical Criminology held onto in the dark years of Thatcherism, becomes a foundation not a playful possibility and, as we shall see, a potential prison.

If we now turn to The Passion we find a markedly different set of relations of opposition and imbrication. The text moves between a historical 'traditional' fictional narrative and a postmodern unmarked textual transition between 'magic' and 'realism'. Winterson's story aims to force the reader to address her own position and positioning and open up the space of subjectivity.

Winterson's use of oppositions — where the characters, narratives or discourses are held together not by difference (their separateness, a hierarchy) but by an inevitable symbiotic relationship

10 Ibid., at 11, 25, 29 & 42.
14 Ibid., at 10.
(i.e. *différence*) — is not a simple disregard for history, a privileging of style. The properties of style (play, pastiche and passion) appear as the very basis of the history that is being written. Similarly the properties of history (experience, character, relations and passion) appear as the roots of the contemporary style. The interweaving of these customarily distinct and hierarchically arranged discourses (history and literature, fact and fiction) becomes the site for a reversal: a playful appreciation of *différence* and an opportunity for a readerly reconstitution of those relations and modes of thought.

For magical realism, the ‘passion’ of which it speaks, serves as a playground for relations of *différence*, within the text and between storyteller and listener. The ‘passion’ itself is unstable, open to play and is foregrounded as such: a playground of opportunities for the construction of discursive and subjective space. Thus in Winterson’s story too, passion is the key. The young Henri, Napoleon’s chicken plucker tells of his first visit to the ‘whorehouse’, where disillusioned, disappointed and depressed, he knows one thing: “I was waiting for Bonaparte.” The single minded passion is of such an intensity that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ and everything else becomes as shadows: “I saw no one but him.”

“Passion is not so much an emotion as a destiny.” For the two main characters in Winterson’s odyssey, passion is counterposed to mere obsession and to the lukewarm. It falls somewhere between God and the Devil; between love and despair and most often, between fear and sex. The same zero winter, the same gambler’s challenge, the same call to “do it from the heart or not at all,” but here the passion continually slips through one’s fingers. The ‘sweet and precise torture’ of passion that whispers so quietly to radical young knights in search of Gramsci’s holy grail, refuses to sit still or be woven into a barricade banner. Instead it skips and dazzles and plays with the characters leaving them in ecstasy or in prison; in

15 Winterson, *supra* n.2, at 15.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., at 62.
18 Ibid., at 74.
19 Ibid., at 55, 62, 68 & 76.
20 Ibid., at 7.
despair or in the company of wolves. In Jeanette Winterson's technicolour painting of 'passion', privileges over the gambling table are teased as attempts to 'catch the wind'. There is no room for oppositions because the privileged element refuses presence. The opposition to the lukewarm is itself teased constantly: "I'm telling you stories: trust me".

Thus in both stories there is a late eighties call to dispel the 'lukewarm', to survive the 'zero winter' where the 'heartless' and 'passionless' are either unable or unwilling to live their 'passion' by laying it open to the ravages of warfare and frostbite. For magical realism however, the way through 1987, is not through grasping at metaphysical straws, but through opening the playground of language, pulling away the power-full props of difference and, as we shall see, through rocking the fence.

*Act Three: “And they all lived...”*

So much for the instability of our two stories and their denial of or play with the will to truth. We must now turn to the other face of the discursive will: the will to power that runs through all stories and which enabled Critical Criminology to position the 1984-5 Miners' dispute and now can offer us analytical and political possibilities.

*Scene I: ‘Do as I say or grieve’*

The battling armies were ranged at Orgreave. Paramilitary police of snatch squads, flying wedges and rhythmic riot shields faced a tragic trainer-clad vanguard of mute heroes fighting for their communities; for coal not dole. As sympathetic social science wrote the script of powerless martyrdom, the drama unfolded and trade unionist tactics were dragged into inevitable defeat.

The narrative of the Miners' dispute is now littered with stories of heroic struggles. Listen to the titles from the special issue of the *Journal of Law and Society*: "The State v The People ..."; 'Miners in Prison: Workers in Prison: Political Prisoners'; 'Miners in the Arms of the Law...'; "The best thing that ever happened to us".21 Within

each, a heroic but powerless vanguard is presented as paralysed by the courts and policed by road block and snatch squads. The stories spun around the coal fires of academia speak of defeat, of being 'beaten' into submission, of being dominated discursively by the media, legally by injunction and bail conditions, politically by hegemony and physically by truncheon.

Critical social science, searching for its post-1968 organic role served unwittingly to position the miners in the museum of macho martyrdom before the first police charge. And Critical Criminology stood on the virtual battlefield telling the troops with one breath to "trust me, I'm telling your story" and with another that they were powerless and heroic, mute and tragic.

This is not to deny the legal and physical weaponry ranged against the pickets but to raise the issue of the discursive constitution of powerlessness. There is a need for a storyteller with an analysis which can address the play of power, whilst allowing the subjects of power to play.

Gilles Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche offers just such a way of addressing power, that when coupled with 'deconstruction' allows a dynamic way of analysing the 'play of power' and a strategic option in the battle over subjectivity and space.

What defines a body is [the] ... relation between dominant and dominated forces. Every relationship of forces constitutes a body — whether it is chemical, biological social or political. Any two forces being unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship.

On such a body, forces engage in the 'play of power', in the construction or deconstruction of subjectivity. These forces are not just quantitative, dominant or dominated along the axis of 'weaponry', physical or discursive. Forces have also an aspect of quality that places them in an active or reactive position in the battle over subjectivity. Forces are active when they are in control within power relations; they are reactive when they are being positioned by an active force.

The analysis of active-reactive force relations, offers 'deconstruction' a political entrance. Nietzsche's claim is that a reactive force seeks not to take over the active position, but to drag the active

23 Ibid., at 40.
force down to its own level, to render it reactive. A ‘reactive decom-
position’ spirals forces downwards into becoming reactive, a spiral
that political deconstruction can break.

Following this analysis, public order policing situations can be
addressed as confrontations over ‘space’ and ‘subjectivity’. Public-
order policing is a type of positioning whereby the forces ranged
across the body social are not fixed in active or reactive qualities but
are continually reconstituted, ‘dividing’ each other in a ‘reactive
decomposition’.

Scene II: The times they are a changin’: space and subjectivity at
Wapping

Although always in a ‘dominated’ position in terms of weaponry
and physical presence, the printers and their supporters at Wapping
were, on occasions, in an ‘active’ position. In terms of space, when
they held rallies, marches, speeches etc. and in terms of subjectivity
when, for example the residents of the area demanded that the po-
lice recognise them as locals and prosecute the TNT drivers for traf-

cic offences. The Police in these instances were in a reactive situa-
tion. Thus the reactive police ‘force’ had to separate the active
marchers from their control of space through legal prohibitions, in-
juctions and bail conditions and from the constitution of their own
subjectivity through the media, government, and police portrayals
of ‘the enemy within’ and, as noted, by the social scientists’
constitution of powerlessness. The once active force is now rendered
reactive, woven within stories of a vanguard but powerless reaction.

At other times, the policing force was in an active position; spa-
tially when they defined and segregated a public and police space
around the Wapping plant; in terms of subjectivity when they drew
themselves as maintainers of the peace and preventers of disorder.

24 See, for example, the NCCL’s discussion of ‘Wapping Resident’s
Stickers’ in No Way in Wapping (London, NCCL, 1986), 13, and the
London Strategic Policy Unit’s discussion of residents’ protests in
Policing Wapping: An Account of the Dispute 1986/7 (Police Monitor-
ing and Research Group Briefing Paper No.3.).

25 See, for example, London Strategic Policy Unit, supra n.24, at 29, and
their reference to a Police Review article seeking to dispel the ‘ghost’ of
the Broadwater Farm (30.1.87) at 17. More generally in terms of the
Thus the reactive pickets can now be seen as separating the police from their space and their subjectivity. Dividing and subjectifying the now becoming-reactive police. Once again, pickets and police are caught in circles of power\textsuperscript{26} whereby neither force achieves a fully active position and the public order confrontation becomes a decomposition of reaction-becoming reaction.

'Ha-ha!,' cry the Francophobes, 'is this not exactly what nihilistic deconstruction seeks to do?'

On the contrary, the dynamic process of 'becoming' of forces opens up political possibilities evident in another public order policing situation.

\textit{Scene III: England's Greenham pleasant land}

The nine-mile fence at the USAF base at Greenham Common existed in both material and semiotic space; a gesture of defiance calling seductively for a reactive quantitative attack; an oppositional gesture of presence. In short it silently screamed "You are! I am! come on ... make my day!" The women's peace camp ranged against it did not hold onto the meta-narratives of critical social theory, nor of feminist essentialism, but built their public order strategy around deconstruction and the play of power. Where oppositional subjectivities were offered and leaders requested, the women's peace camp resolutely refused. Where battle taunts were issued, immovable pacifism pulled the ground away. Where debate was sought, silence remained the unbearable repartee. The women refused a quantitative frontal assault; theirs was a qualitative statement, an active story.

As we have seen, 'deconstruction' works by pushing fundamental concepts to their limits. At first sight, Greenham strategies of adding to the fence and of pushing the idea of separation and barrier to its limits seem the politics of gesture and futility. The wool, flowers and mirrors woven into the fence accentuated its physical space and played with its symbolic position as guarantor of presence and subjective security. The resultant pastiche actively high-

\textsuperscript{26} M. Foucault, \textit{Power/Knowledge} (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).

lighted the cold-war modernist opposition between Camelot and 'the Evil Empire', between the forces of order and the 'enemy within', between the women and the soldiers.

As long as opposition remained just that, and protest was restricted to one side of the fence, the order was preserved. But the 'Greenham Carnival' played the fool and turned that logic back on itself. The soldiers within and the State without were faced not with an Other playing along, but with a mirror, many mirrors that took the secure grounding in subjective opposition away from under their feet. Gone was the supplementary Other as object of transference; gone was the attack from outside to counter; gone was the security of planned strategies of attack. All that was left was a force setting the active agenda, highlighting the physical, semiotic and legal oppositions at the basis of 'reactive-becoming reactive' battles and exposing the relations of différence which open up the political playground.

Where modernist practice might tell stories of a 'protest-fence' opposition, the politics of deconstruction pulled away the reactive security of essences and set up relations of play. Just as the Berlin Wall deconstructed under the weight not of a physical but a 'micro-physical' revolution, so the Greenham Carnival refused to oppose and set up a play that a statist logos could not handle. It was not just 'The Fence' that fell, it was its hold...

The legal fences were also rocked at Greenham, as their basis in structures of opposition was deconstructed. Within English law 'Public Order' and the 'Queen's Peace' is established to protect 'government', to claim allegiance and to position subjects. When the women were faced with a wounded 'Queen's Peace' in court, they argued that the basis of their actions (defending public peace and international law) were the very basis of the Queen's order which was being held in privilege over them.

27 For a broader discussion of issues around the different interests infringed by Public Order and Criminal Law, see A.T.H. Smith, *Offences Against Public Order* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987).

Act Four: 'Governmentality'

The Greenham women's deconstruction left the women, not innocent (and often not at liberty), but occupying nonetheless the active legal position in terms of the legitimacy and hold of the law. What the cases highlight is again what Critical Criminology resolutely refuses to deal with: the instability of 'The Law' in its broadest discursive sense, of 'the operations of the law' in concrete instances, and of what Foucault has addressed as 'governmentality'.

Critical Criminology's storytellers will doubtless as we speak be rushing to dissect the contradictions and tensions within 'the rule of law' and the capitalist economic and legal orders. It is important however to push these tensions to their limits, and expose the debilitating liberal democratic and neo-marxist conception of policing as a supplement to an underlying capitalist, patriarchal, legal order.

As has been seen, Critical Criminology cannot and does not want to address the disciplinary discourse of 'policing': the generalised powerful discourse and practice that serves to position space and subjectivity. Similarly, the operations of policing should not be seen, as both radical and conservative commentators could argue, as just a dangerous supplement to 'the law'. Instead, both 'policing' and 'law' are constituents of an archi-policing or 'cameralism', that science of government, that Foucault called governmentality. In this context 'policing' is the bio-discipline of bodies, spaces and subjectivities operating through qualitative discourse and practices, as well as quantitative operations of 'The Police'.

The nature of 'policing' can itself be rendered unstable within this broader context. For the liberal democratic State the local basis of the police is privileged over the national character of policing. For Critical Criminology on the other hand nationalised policing is privileged over its local appearance. Both sets of oppositions retain the legitimacy and will to truth of governmentality and both can be deconstructed.

There is a fundamental instability running through the 'science of policing'. Liberal democratic discourse and Critical Criminology

both separate the Police from the Public, the police from the policed. But this rhetorical relation is incapable of supporting the discursive weight laid upon it. When the Police are privileged over the policed the characteristics of the policed public (free will, rights prescribed by law and equality under the law) appear as the very basis of the policing force, evidenced in debates over police discretion, accountability and control. Similarly when the reverse hierarchy is presented, the fundamental characteristics of the now supplementary ‘Police’ (responsibility to uphold the law and the guardian duties of citizenry) appear at the roots of the liberal democratic polis.

The bulwarks of difference and stability refuse the philosophical weight they are asked to carry and cameralist governmentality appears as a discourse shot through with différence. Its discursive operation and oppositions, in active-reactive relations of flux, offer a playground for a legal, or a police critique to intervene.

And where is the criminological critique of policing? Is it following the Critical Legal Studies movement as they seek to open up legal doctrine? Is it addressing its own unstable Will to Truth/Power within ‘cameralism’? Is it opening up the playground for forces to construct their own ‘cameralisms’? Or, is it telling stories?

Epilogue: “You have nothing to lose but your chains”

As with all the best stories (or at least storytellers) therefore I leave my listeners with the possibility of a sequel, for it is self-contained narratives that contain selves. More than that however I leave my story unfinished because it is completed narratives signed by an author that take the place of declarations signed by the King. As Foucault would argue: we need to cut off the King’s head; as Zen Buddhists might argue: if you meet a storyteller on the road, kill him (sic).